Corporate Governance

Purpose – The prevalent literature considers interlocking directorates as a mechanisms of cooperation among companies, but if the same director seats on the boards of two companies that are in competition, interlocking directorates, matching cooperation with competition, become a coopetition mechanism. This article aims to argue that the analysis of both the structure and the evolution of interlocking directorates provides some relevant insights on the driving forces behind the coopetition among firms.

Design/methodology/approach – Through a longitudinal study the authors analyzed relations among Italian listed firms belonging to financial or manufacturing sectors and traced the evolution networks of interlocking directorates among them. They then analyzed the coopetitive nature of interlocking directorates among firms acting in the same sector that are in direct competition and their impact on M&A processes.

Findings – It was evidenced that interlocking directorates among firms belonged to the same industry could be considered a coopetitive mechanism if they facilitate formation of deeper relations among competitors such as their integration through M&A.

Originality/value – This article offers a new perspective of analysis in interlocking directorates' field of research.